All of the recent news about Target, Neiman Marcus, and other businesses being hacked might be a surprise to many but it’s no surprise to us. Truth is that practice of security has devolved into a political image focused designed satisfy technically inept regulatory requirements that do little or nothing to protect critical business assets. What’s worse is that many security companies are capitalizing on this devolution rather than providing effective solutions in the spirit of good security. This is especially true with regards to the penetration testing industry.
We all know that money is the lifeblood of business and that a failure to meet regulatory requirements threatens that lifeblood. After all, when a business is not in compliance it runs the risk of being fined or not being allowed to operate. In addition the imaginary expenses associated with true security are often perceived as a financial burden (another lifeblood threat). This is usually because the RoI of good security is only apparent when a would-be compromise is prevented. Too many business managers are of the opinion that “it won’t happen to us” until they become a target and it does. These combined ignorant views degrade the overall importance of real security and make the satisfaction of regulatory requirements the top priority. This is unfortunate given that compliance often has little to do with actual security.
Most regulatory requirements are so poorly defined they can be satisfied with the most basic solution. For example PCI-DSS requires merchants to undergo regular penetration tests and yet it completely fails to define the minimum level of threat (almost synonymous with quality) that those tests should be delivered at. This lack of clear definition gives business owners the ability to satisfy compliance with the cheapest most basic of testing services. To put this into perspective, if the standards used to test bulletproof vests (NIJ and HOSDB test methods) were replaced by PCI–DSS then bulletproof vest testing could be satisfied with a squirt gun.
These substandard regulatory requirements combined with business owners lacking in true security expertise formed a market where exceedingly low quality, low-threat, easy to deliver security-testing services are in high-demand. This market has been answered by a horde of self-proclaimed security experts that in almost all cases are little more than marginally capable script-kids and yet they inaccurately market their services as best in class. Take away their third party tools (scripts, scanners, Metasploit, etc.) and those vendors will be dead in the water. Take the tools away from a bona fide researcher or hacker and they’ll write new tools then hack you with a vengeance.
The saturation of the penetration testing industry with charlatans makes the process of identifying a quality vendor difficult for business managers that actually care about security. In many cases the consumer is a non-technical (or non-security expert) buyer and not able to truly assess the technical capabilities of the vendor. As a result they often make buy decisions based on the non-technical exploration of things like the number customers serviced, annual revenue, size of company, etc. While these are important factors when evaluating any business, they are by no means a measure of service quality and testing vendor capability. With regards to penetration testing services, quality of service is of the utmost importance and it is a highly technical matter. This is why we wrote a guide to vendor selection that sets a standard of quality and was featured on Forbes.
It is unfortunate that most business owners don’t seem to operate in spirit of good security but instead operate with revenue focused tunnel vision. The irony of this is that the cost of a quality penetration test is equal to a small fraction of the cost of a single successful compromise. For example, in 2011 Sony suffered a compromise that resulted in over 170 million dollars in damages (not including fines). This compromise was the result of the exploitation of a basic SQL Injection vulnerability in a web server (like Target). The average cost of Netragard’s web application penetration testing services in 2013 was $14,000.00 and our services would have detected the basic SQL Injection vulnerability that cost Sony so much money. Perhaps its time to rethink the value of genuine penetration testing? Clearly genuine penetration testing has a positive revenue impact through prevention. Specifically the Return on Investment of a genuine penetration test is equal to the cost in damages of a single successful compromise.
So what of Target.
We know that target was initially compromised through the exploitation of a vulnerability in one of their web servers (just like Sony and so many others). This vulnerability went unidentified for some time even after the initial malicious compromise. Why did malicious hackers find this vulnerability before Target? Why was Target unaware of their existing paths to both compromise data exfiltration? Who determined that Target was PCI compliant when PCI specifically requires environmental segregation and Target’s environment was clearly not properly segregated?
A path to compromise is the path that an attacker must take in order to access sensitive information. In the case of Target this information was cardholder data. The attackers had no issue exploiting a path to compromise and propagating their attack from their initial point of compromise to the Point of Sale terminals. The existence of the path to compromise should have resulted PCI failure, why didn’t it?
A path for data exfiltration is the method that an attacker uses to extract data from a compromised network. In the case of Target the attackers were able to extract a large amount of information before any sort of preventative response could be taken. This demonstrates that a path for data exfiltration existed and may still exist today. As with the path to compromise, the path for data exfiltration should have resulted in a PCI failure, why didn’t it?
We also know that Target’s own security monitoring capabilities were (and probably still are) terrible. Based on a Krebs on Security article, the hackers first uploaded malware to Targets points of sale. Then they configured a control server on Target’s internal network to which the malware would report cardholder data. Then the hackers would login to the control server remotely and repeatedly to download the stolen cardholder data. Why and how did target fail to detect this activity in time to prevent the incident?
If we use the little information that we have about Targets compromise as a light-weight penetration testing report we can provide some generic, high-level methods for remediation. What we’re suggesting here is hardly a complete solution (because the full details aren’t known) but it’s good advice nonetheless.
Philippe has over 10 years of experience in the banking and financial sector that includes security assessment of large and complex infrastructures and penetration testing of data & voice networks, operating systems, middleware and web applications in Europe, US and Middle East.
Previously, Philippe held roles within the information system security department of a global pharmaceutical company in London. While working with a heterogeneous network of over 100,000 users across the world and strict regulatory requirements, Philippe gained hands-on experience with various security technologies (VPN, Network and Application Firewalls, IDS, IPS, Host Intrusion Prevention, etc.)
Philippe actively participates in the Information Security community. He has discovered and published several security vulnerabilities in leading products such as Cisco, Symantec and Hewlett-Packard.
He is a Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH), PCI Qualified Security Assessors (PCI-QSA), OSSTMM Professional Security Analyst (OPSA), OSSTMM Professional Security Tester (OPST), Certified in Risk and Information Systems Control (CRISC)and Associate Member of the Business Continuity Institute (AMBCI).